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• Objective: evaluate DAA safety and operational suitability 
sensitivity to EO/IR characteristics to inform the MOPS
• Presented preliminary safety results in October: this slide 
package includes additional metrics that were collected during 
the EO/IR simulation runs
– Additional metrics include operational suitability metrics such as splits, reversals 
and pilot workload
– Performed parameter sweep based on the following table:
• Extended parameter sweeps were performed based on 
feedback
Overview
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• DAIDALUS Version 1.0.1 was used in the simulation
– Default SC-228 non-cooperative well-clear definition (2200 ft., 450 ft., 0 𝛕𝛕𝐦𝐦𝐦𝐦𝐦𝐦*) 
– Same configuration as low C-SWaP simulation: 
• Time to the volume for alerting (valid for Phase 1 UAS as well):
30 seconds for Warning
60 seconds for Corrective
• Guidance based on 7 deg/sec turn rate
• 4 second persistence and 2-of-4 (m of n) alerts (valid for Phase 1 UAS as well)
• SC-228 Pilot Model
– Deterministic mode
– Horizontal maneuvers
– Issues 7 deg/sec turns
– No buffer on minimum suggestive guidance
• Simulation uses low C-SWaP encounter-set: NASA UAS trajectories for the 
ownship vs. MIT LL uncorrelated encounter model for the intruder
– Ownship speed ranges from 40-100 kts; Intruder speed ranges from 0-170 kts
– Ownship/intruder altitude: 500 AGL-10000 ft MSL
EO/IR Simulation Assumptions
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EO/IR Parametric Model
1. Farjon J., “White paper EO/IR sensor model”, SAFRAN ED, 2019
• Range estimation error1:
– 𝜀𝜀 𝑅𝑅 = 𝜇𝜇 𝑅𝑅 + 𝜎𝜎 𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 1
• R = range (meters)
• 𝜇𝜇 𝑅𝑅 = 50 − 0.15 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 0; 𝑅𝑅 − 3000 (error bias at range R)
Bias not considered in default model configuration
• 𝜎𝜎 𝑅𝑅 = 0.03 ∗ 𝑅𝑅 (error standard deviation at range R)
• Randn: Matlab Normally distributed random numbers
– Time correlation is 5 s
• Range rate estimation error1:
– σ is 5% of true range rate (e.g., if range rate is 200 kts, std. dev. is 10 kt)
– Delay is 5 s (time needed to provide information from first detection)
– Time correlation is 2 s (TBC)
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• Bearing and elevation error1:Angle measurement error is Gaussian white noise
σ < 1 mrad (standard deviation)
Measurements are not time correlated
• Bearing and elevation rate error1:Angular rate error is Gauss-Markov noise
σ < 1.4 mrad/s (standard deviation)
Temporal decay time is approx. 10 samples
• No field of regard (FOR) limits for azimuth and elevation
• 2.5 nautical mile detection range
EO/IR Parametric Model (Cont.)
1. Farjon J., “White paper EO/IR sensor model”, SAFRAN ED, 2019 5
Example Encounter 1
Black line is ownship; Black dotted line is ownship nominal trajectory; Mitigated trajectory uses EOIR for DAA
Blue dashed line is intruder
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Track angle and vertical rate residual for example 
encounter 1
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Ownship Alert state for example encounter 1
8
Example Encounter 2
Black line is ownship; Black dotted line is ownship nominal trajectory; Mitigated trajectory uses EOIR for DAA
Blue dashed line is intruder
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Track angle and vertical rate residual for example 
encounter 2
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Ownship Alert state for example encounter 2
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• The ADSB and ATAR sensors have their outputs put through the 
FAA Tech Center DAA Tracker, smoothing the tracks
• The EOIR sensor model output is not fed through a tracker, 
which causes noisy track angle and noisy vertical rate signals
• The ownship alert plots show that the EOIR sensor causes more 
splits when compared to using the ADSB or ATAR sensor
• Note:
– Range time correlation = 5 sec for EOIR, 8 sec for ATAR (from Tech Center tracker)
– Range rate time correlation = 2 sec for EOIR, 1.7 sec for ATAR (from Tech Center 
tracker)
Example encounters
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• General approach is to vary individual sensor parameters from 
the default parameters to evaluate sensitivity 
– Additional scenarios evaluated to contextualize the results:
• No error: no measurement error or detection range limits
• No bias: the default model parameters with the exception of the range bias
• 4000 ft vertical: vertical alerting threshold of DAIDALUS set to 4000 ft (similar 
to the MOPS recommendation for encounters with noncooperative aircraft)
• It is assumed that there is not an additional filter after the 
EO/IR model, so the EO/IR outputs are used directly by the 
alerting and guidance
– Therefore, the EO/IR output characteristics can form the basis for Table 2-20 in 
DO-365 (Single-Source Integrated Track Performance)
• Key safety metrics are risk ratio (based on NMAC) and LoWC
ratio: measures the fraction of the events remaining after the 
DAA system is employed (desire much less than 1)
Approach
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Risk Ratio for all configurations
*Note: all other configurations do not include range bias component
*
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• The largest risk ratio belongs to the 1 NM detection range 
configuration
• The risk ratio is most sensitive to increasing the angular rate 
error and decreasing the detection range
• The risk ratio is insensitive to the range and range rate error, 
but does show some sensitivity when they are both increased 
together (when increased to more than 400% of their default 
values)
Risk Ratio for all configurations
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LoWC Ratio for all configurations
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• Generally, the trend for each configuration sweep is the same 
as the risk ratio trends
• The largest LoWC ratio belongs to the 1 NM detection range 
configuration
• The LoWC ratio is most sensitive to increasing the angular rate 
error and decreasing the detection range
• The LoWC ratio is insensitive to the range and range rate error, 
but does show some sensitivity when they are both increased 
together (when increased to more than 400% of their default 
values)
• The LoWC ratio for the default without range bias 
configuration is slightly lower than the default with range bias 
configuration
LoWC for all configurations
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• Reversals: 
– Reversals are based off of commanded headings from the pilot model
• An encounter has a reversal if the commanded heading changes sign (e.g., from turn left to turn right)
• Splits
– Splits are based off of the alert level from DAIDALUS
• An encounter has a split if DAIDALUS issues an alert of any type, the alert clears, and then DAIDALUS 
issues another alert of any type
• Note: preventive alerts are suppressed in the simulation so this metric is not impacted by preventive 
alerts
• Pilot workload
– Pilot workload is approximated as the total number of maneuvers performed over all encounters for a 
given configuration
Operational Suitability Metrics
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Operational Suitability Metrics: Splits for encounters 
where there was a nominal LoWC
Note: weighted probability simply indicates that the encounter likelihood was considered when computing the probability
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Operational Suitability Metrics: Splits for non-maneuvering 
encounters with a nominal LoWC
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• Consistent with the safety results, the parameters that have 
the largest effect on splits are variable angular rate and 
variable detection range
• For non-maneuvering encounters with nominal LoWC, the split 
probability is similar, if not higher, to the split probability for all 
encounters with nominal LoWC
• One possible reason for the large split probability is the 
ownship maneuvering to the edge of the band resolves the 
alert only momentarily
– Large probability of split for the no errors case implies that split alerts are not 
heavily influenced by sensor error
– Investigation of encounters has shown that the ownship overshoots the 
commanded heading and oscillates around it before settling
– One solution is to add a 5-10° buffer to the commanded heading, as to prevent 
the ownship from reentering the alerted guidance bands
Operational Suitability Metrics (Splits)
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Operational Suitability Metrics: Reversals only for 
encounters where there was a nominal LoWC
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Operational Suitability Metrics: Reversals for non-
maneuvering encounters with a nominal LoWC
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• For the no sensor error configuration, the probability of a 
reversal occurring given a nominal LoWC is approximately 79%
– This is the highest reversal probability for the default configurations
• The probability of a reversal occurring is sensitive to increasing 
the angular rate and both the range and range-rate
– The default configurations (with and without range bias) have a lower 
probability of reversal than the no sensor error configuration
– The probability of reversal also increases once the range-rate error reaches a 
certain threshold, in this case 400%, as seen in the variable range-rate error plot
– The reversal probability also increases for smaller detection ranges
• For non-maneuvering encounters with a nominal LoWC, the 
reversal probability is similar to the reversal probability for all 
encounters with a nominal LoWC
• Large probability of reversals for the no errors case implies 
that guidance reversals are not heavily influenced by sensor 
error
– Ownship heading oscillations in conjunction with the pilot maneuver update can 
trigger the reversal metric
Operational Suitability Metrics (Reversals)
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Operational Suitability Metrics: Pilot Workload for All 
Encounters*
*A maneuver is defined as any update to the pilot heading, no matter the magnitude of the maneuver 25
• A maneuver is defined as any update to the pilot heading, no 
matter the magnitude of the maneuver
• The pilot workload metric for all encounters calculates the 
average number of maneuvers per nominal LoWC
– Can be understood as the maneuver rate
• The general trend is that more sensor noise leads to more 
maneuvers
• The 4000 ft vertical configuration had the most pilot 
maneuvers, due to the large vertical alerting threshold
• The pilot workload is sensitive to angular rate error, and 
sensitive to range and range-rate error once it is above a 
certain threshold
– Increasing the range and range-rate error at the same time increases the pilot 
workload at a greater rate than increasing either one individually
Operational Suitability Metrics (Pilot Workload)
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Operational Suitability Metrics: Average number of 
maneuvers per encounter for encounters w/ a nominal LoWC
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Operational Suitability Metrics: Average number of 
maneuvers per encounter
• The no sensor error configuration had the lowest average 
number of maneuvers with approximately 5.6 maneuvers per 
encounter
• The average number of maneuvers per encounter is most 
sensitive to increasing angular rate error
– Increasing the range and range-rate errors above a certain threshold also has an 
effect
– The range bias does have a small effect on the average number of ownship
maneuvers
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• Alert ratio is defined as the ratio of all ownship alerts to nominal NMACs
• There is a common trend among all configurations, where a larger error leads to a larger alert ratio
– For detection range, a smaller detection range leads to a smaller alert ratio
– Alert ratio is least sensitive to range and range-rate error
• A smaller alert ratio and risk ratio implies more effective DAA maneuvers
System Operating Characteristic: 
Risk Ratio vs. Alert Ratio
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• Variable angular rate error and variable detection range have 
the greatest effect on safety and operational suitability 
metrics, especially alert ratio and workload
– Reversals and splits are largely unaffected by EOIR parameters
• Require EO/IR WG feedback: are the results presented thus far 
sufficient to establish associated MOPS requirements, or is 
additional data required?
Conclusion
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• Run simulations with buffer on minimum suggestive guidance 
(e.g., 15°)
– Splits may be caused by following guidance too closely and overshooting 
desired heading
• Add expected # of split/reversals to the metrics 
– Currently only capture whether an encounter had any split/reversal
• Investigate effect of EOIR error time correlation
Next Steps
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Backup
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Example 1 guidance - EOIR
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Example 1 guidance - EOIR
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Example 1 guidance - ADSB
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Example 1 guidance - ADSB
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Example 1 guidance - ATAR
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Example 1 guidance - ATAR
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Example 2 guidance - EOIR
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Example 2 guidance - EOIR
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Example 2 guidance - ADSB
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Example 2 guidance - ADSB
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Example 2 guidance - ATAR
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Example 2 guidance - ATAR
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Operational Suitability Metrics: Pilot Workload only for 
encounters where there was a nominal LoWC
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• The trend of increasing the sensor noise leading to more pilot 
maneuvers remains the same
• There is a drop-off in the number of pilot maneuvers for 
encounters where there was a nominal LoWC when compared 
to all encounters
– The difference in pilot workload from encounters with a nominal LoWC to all 
encounters can be interpreted as the number of unnecessary maneuvers 
Operational Suitability Metrics: Pilot Workload for 
Nominal LoWC Encounters
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Reversal example - no sensor error
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Reversal example - no sensor error
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Split example – no sensor error
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Split example - no sensor error
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